Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy:
The Human Development Sequence
Components of a Pro-Democratic Civic Culture

Rival Theories of Political Culture

From the outset, scholars of political culture have claimed that the functioning and persistence of democratic institutions at the system-level is closely linked with prevailing mass tendencies in individual-level attitudes and value orientations (Lerner, 1958; Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966). Thus, the notion of a population-system linkage that ties political institutions at the system-level to mass cultural tendencies at the individual-level is essential for the whole political culture school. Awareness of this linkage has already been made explicit in classic Greek times by Aristotle and during the Enlightenment by Charles de Montesquieu (1989 [1748]), both of whom argued that different forms of government reflect the kind of virtues that prevail among a people. Awareness of this insight re-emerged in explanations of the Nazi takeover in Weimar Germany. Many observers concluded that the causes of this disaster could be summed up in Bracher’s (1971 [1955]) phrase that Weimar was a “democracy without democrats.” The essence of this phrase is that the fate of political systems depends vitally on people’s posture to it, which is probably the most basic premise of the political culture school and certainly one of the most fundamental justifications of survey research in political attitudes and value orientations.

Starting from this premise, Almond and Verba (1963) launched the first comparative empirical survey of the mass attitudes that are presumably linked with the stability and functioning of democracies. They concluded that a healthy mixture of “subject orientations” and “participant orientations” was conducive to a “civic culture” that helps democracies to flourish. Under the influence of the student revolt in the late 1960s, a series of comparative survey studies followed, maintaining the existence of strong linkages between mass tendencies in particular individual-level attitudes and value orientations and democratic institutions at the system-level (among others see Barnes and Kaase et al., 1979; Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt, 1981; Putnam, 1993; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; van Deth and Scarbrough, 1996; Inglehart, 1997; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2002; Norris, 2002). The emergence of new democracies in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Central Eastern Europe caused another avalanche of studies into political culture (among many others see Gibson, Dutch and Tedin, 1997; Hofferbert and Klingemann, 1999; Gibson, 2001; Mishler and Rose, 2000; Bratton and Mattes, 2000; Newton, 2002; Diamond, 2003). Usually, these studies conclude that mass tendencies in certain individual-level attitudes and value orientations are helpful in consolidating democracy at the system-level. Anyway, almost all studies in the political culture tradition claim in one or the other way that mass tendencies in individual-level attitudes and value orientations are important for the functioning of democracy at the system-level. One can reasonably conclude that this is the basic creed of the political culture school by which most of its advocates justify their research.

Surprisingly, however, in face of the fundamentality of this claim, only a small number of political culture studies have actually tested it (for example, Putnam, 1993; Muller and Seligson, 1994; Inglehart, 1997: chapter 6; Paxton, 2002; Newton, 2003). Most political culture studies simply maintain that certain individual-level attitudes are
important for democracy at the system-level, only to use this claim as a justification to analyze these attitudes at the individual-level. It is almost standard in survey data analyses that scholars justify individual-level analyses of attitudes based on assumptions about the system-level effects of these attitudes—without testing the system-level effects.

Using “support for democracy” as a placeholder for other presumably pro-democratic attitudes, the argument usually goes as follows (example): “Support for democracy is an attitude that is important for democracy because … [here one can insert a number of reasons from the respective literature]. Because of its relevance to democracy, it is important to know what determines support for democracy at the individual-level. In the following we analyze … [here imagine a number of regression analyses showing which demographic variables and which other attitudes have a significant effect on support for democracy]. Summing up, we have shown that [say “education” and “trust”] have a significant effect on support for democracy. Hence, we conclude that in order to foster democracy one should raise education and strengthen trust.”

The logical structure of this sort of analyses is problematic. It involves exactly the sort of cross-level inference that one should avoid (Inglehart and Welzel, 2003). In the example above, the whole analysis is based on the assumption that mass support for democracy is essential to democratic institutions at the system-level. But this assumption remains untested, completely relying on its face-validity. We consider this approach as inappropriate. If one is interested in a certain attitude because one assumes that mass tendencies in this attitude are important for democracy at the system-level, one should analyze the system-level effects of this attitude, not its individual-level determination. This means to reverse the analytical design of standard political culture studies, which is what we try to do in this chapter: we test whether mass tendencies in self-expression values or mass tendencies in alternative attitudes and value orientations have a stronger system-level effect on democracy. As the previous chapter has shown, no individual-level analyses are necessary to validate effects to be found at the system-level.

Given that so few studies actually tested the system-level claims of the political culture school, it is no surprise that the thesis that mass attitudes undermine or promote the functioning and persistence of democracies, has been widely disputed outside the camp of survey researchers. There has been a continuing debate about the causal direction underlying the relationship between mass attitudes and democratic institutions. Rustow (1970), for example, argued that mass support for democracy can derive from disappointing experiences with authoritarian rule. But “intrinsically” democratic values that reflect a deeply-rooted commitment to democratic norms, can only emerge through habituation: that is, learning democratic norms through practice under existing democratic institutions. According to Rustow, democratic mass values are not a precondition for functioning democracies but a consequence of them. Similarly, in a sharp critique of Putnam (1993) and Inglehart (1997), Jackman and Miller (1998) claimed that a democratic mass culture is the product of well functioning democratic institutions, instead of being conducive to them (see also Muller and Seligson, 1994).

In Chapter 8, we examined these contradictory arguments, hypothesizing that the emancipative nature of self-expression values reflects a strong commitment to democratic norms, such as liberty and tolerance. Accordingly, we tested empirically whether self-expression values are shaped by previous experience under democratic institutions or
whether these values help shape subsequent democratic institutions. The results are unequivocal: controlling for socioeconomic development, prior democratic institutions have only a minuscule effect on self-expression values; but self-expression values do have a strong and significant effect on subsequent democratic institutions, even holding socioeconomic development constant. Likewise, controlling for temporal autocorrelation, self-expression values do show a significant effect on democratic institutions but the reverse is not true (see again Figure 8-2). These findings suggest that a major causal arrow operates from democratic values to democratic institutions. This does not foreclose reciprocal effects from institutions to values. But even if such reciprocal effects existed (actually we found little evidence for them), this would not invalidate the effect that we saw running from values to institutions. The least one conclude from these findings is that important effects from prevailing mass tendencies in individual-level value orientations on democracy at the system-level do actually exist.

Given that mass values affect democracy, one would like to know precisely which mass values affect democracy most strongly. Our emancipative version of human development implies that self-expression values should be most crucial for democracy. But other scholars emphasize different values. This chapter analyses which of these approaches is most consistent with the empirical evidence.

**Three Competing Approaches**

The overview in Table 11-1 shows that the political culture school is divided into three camps, with adherents of each camp emphasizing different types of mass values as most important in strengthening democracy. We label these approaches the legitimacy approach (or system-support approach), the communitarian approach (or social capital approach) and the human development approach (or emancipative approach).

To begin with, David Easton (1965) argues that all political systems need legitimacy, which they obtain in so far as the public supports a system’s concrete institutions as well as the system as a totality. Accordingly, adherents of the legitimacy approach hold that mass support for democracy as a system of governance, and mass confidence in public institutions, are the sources that provide democracies with the legitimacy that they need to remain stable and to operate effectively (see Gibson, 1997; Klingemann, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Seligson, 2002). Advocates of this approach tend to consider democracy as a limited set of institutional mechanisms that regulate the remote domain of official politics. Thus, the operation of democratic institutions is only loosely related to people’s daily lives and does not require a public that is characterized by such morally demanding virtues as tolerance and trust. These virtues may be relevant for people’s civic affairs but have no immediate impact on the political institutions hovering above societies—which makes the requirements of institutional stability relatively modest: one does not need a highly civic public; it is sufficient for the stability and efficiency of democratic institutions that a majority of people have a fair amount of confidence in these institutions and that a majority prefers democracy to any alternative system of government (see Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn, 2000; Newton and Norris, 2000; Anderson and Tverdova, 2001; Newton, 2001). Mass support for democracy in particular is considered as crucial in de-legitimizing autocracy and legitimizing democracy.
Table 11-1. Political Culture Approaches

- **Common Premise:**
  There is a population-system linkage, such that mass tendencies in individual-level attitudes and value orientations impact on the performance and stability of democratic institutions at the system-level.

- **“Civics” Camp:**
  Attitudes and value orientations of a broader social concern impact most on the stability and performance of democratic institutions.

- **“Legitimacy” Camp:**
  Legitimacy assigned to political objects impacts most on the stability and performance of democratic institutions.

- **“Human Development” Approach:**
  Self-expression values based on liberty aspirations and liberty tolerance have the strongest impact.

- **“Communitarian” Approach:**
  Voluntary activity in associations, interpersonal trust and norm obedience have the strongest impact.

- **“System Support” Approach:**
  Mass confidence in public institutions, satisfaction with system performance and system preferences for democracy have the strongest impact.

Two other approaches—the communitarian and the human development approach—follow the tradition of the civic culture school in arguing that democracy is more than a limited set of institutional mechanisms that regulate only the remote domain of official politics. Instead, democracy is viewed in the perspective of Alexis de Tocqueville (1994 [1837]): as a system of government whose principles are practiced at the grassroots of society, involving citizens who experience and practice democratic norms in their daily lives. Consequently, making democracy work requires more than just having confidence in institutions and preferring democracy to alternative systems of government. It requires a broader set of civic values that make democratic norms alive at the grassroots.

In this context, adherents of the communitarian approach emphasize those values that link the citizens to daily public life and strengthen their social ties and their loyalty to the community (Bell, 1993; Etzioni, 1996). According to Putnam (1993; 2000) such communal orientations create social capital and are reflected in people’s activities in voluntary associations and in their trust to their fellow citizens. Thus, communitarians and social capital theorists emphasize voluntary activity in associations and interpersonal trust as the “communal” ground on which democracies flourish (see Norris, 2002: chapter 8). Another camp in the communitarian debate emphasizes the citizens’ obedience to laws and their loyalty to rules of good conduct, or what they call “civic honesty” or “trustworthiness,” as the moral resource that sustains and strengthens democracy (Huntington, Crozier, and Watanuki, 1975; Levi, 2000; Rothstein, 2001). In contrast to dictatorships, democracies have only limited sanctions at their disposal in order to
enforce law and order. So they depend more than any other system of government on citizens who voluntarily follow rules and norms and obey laws. In the following, we call this factor “norm obedience.”

The human development approach shares with the communitarian approach the notion that civic values, rather than just specific orientations towards the political system and its institutions, are important for democracy. Human development theory is a theory of human choice, or--more precisely--a theory of the societal conditions that restrict or widen people’s choices. Democracy is one of these conditions. It institutionalizes civil liberties, providing people the legal guarantees to exert free choices in their private and public activities. And since human choice is at the heart of democracy, the civic values that make it work effectively, are those that actually emphasize human choice--which we term self-expression values. Thus, not all communal values and not all sorts of social capital are relevant to democracy but only those ones involving emancipative citizens whose communal engagement is the result of their intrinsic choices and not of their compliance to conformity pressure, exposure to social control or blindfold loyalty to the community. Human development theory considers democracy primarily as an emancipative achievement that empowers people. Therefore, it sees the cultural basis of democracy in mass values that are of an inherently emancipative nature—namely self-expression values.

Interpersonal trust, norm obedience and activity in associations certainly reflect communal values and social capital, but they do not necessarily reflect emancipative forms of communal values and social capital. Communal values and social capital are not per se emancipative. Communal values can be based on authoritarian and xenophobic ideals that have a discriminatory and anti-emancipative character. Likewise, social capital can be embedded in closely-knit networks that expose people to group pressure, rather than emancipating them from such pressure. According to human development theory, these forms of communal values and social capital should not operate in favor of democracy. But emancipative ideals and emancipative forms of social capital should do so. Emancipative ideals place individual liberty over collective discipline, human diversity over group conformity, and civic autonomy over state authority. Correspondingly, emancipative forms of social capital loosen people’s dependence on closely-knit groups while integrating them into webs of looser but more diverse human interactions.

Communal values and social capital as such are unspecific to democracy’s focus on human choice. Accordingly, we claim that a more specific but still fundamental sort of orientations gives communal values and social capital a pro-democratic civic drive, namely the values that emphasize human self-expression. These values are intrinsically directed against human discrimination and most sharply targeted at the liberating elements of democracy. Unlike communitarians, the human development approach does not subscribe to Almond and Verba’s notion (1963) that a strong component of “subject orientations” is an integral part of a democratic civic culture. Quite the contrary, we claim that the problem of weak, ineffective or absent democracy is not a lack of collective discipline, group conformity, and norm obedience. In most cases it is the lack of civic defiance, disobedience, and self-expression that makes the job of authoritarian rulers all too easy. Not a more compliant but a more emancipative posture is what most publics need to become more democratic.
Self-expression values include a postmaterialist emphasis on personal and political liberty, civilian protest activities, tolerance of the liberty of others, and a sense of subjective well-being reflected in life satisfaction. Interpersonal trust, too, belongs to this syndrome of self-expression values (see Table 2-1). For this reason, interpersonal trust tends to be linked with democracy as well. But we assume that this linkage is indirect, operating through the connection that interpersonal trust has to other components of the self-expression values syndrome, above all liberty aspirations. Among the various components of the self-expression values syndrome, postmaterialistic aspirations for personal and political liberty are most sharply focused on human choice and the civil liberties that guarantee it. Consequently, we hypothesize that these postmaterialistic aspirations should be most closely associated with democracy.

In short, there are three distinct approaches emphasizing three different aspects of mass culture as being most conducive to democracy: (1) the legitimacy approach (or system support approach) emphasizes institutional confidence and support for democracy. The latter in particular is considered as a crucial mass tendency in de-legitimizing autocracy and legitimizing democracy, regardless of the motivations and values that fuel support for democracy. (2) The communitarian approach (or social capital approach) emphasizes norm obedience, association activity interpersonal trust as indicators of the community-bonds and the civic loyalties that let democracies flourish; and (3) the human development approach (or emancipative approach) emphasizes self-expression values centered on liberty aspirations as the mass orientation most sharply focused on the intrinsic nature of democracy: its emphasis on human choice. Using data from the Values Surveys, we test which of these mass cultural traits is most closely linked with temporally subsequent measures of democracy.

Measuring Formal and Effective Versions of Liberal Democracy

There are various ways to measure democracy: which measurement is best largely depends on one’s theoretical focus (Collier and Adcock, 1999). Our theoretical approach—the concept of human development—focuses on freedom of choice. From this point of view, the liberal aspect of democracy is most important, since civil liberties entitle people to exert free choices in their private and public actions (Sen, 1999; Rose, 1995; 2001). Civil liberties aim at empowering citizens to effective choice in shaping their daily activities, which makes democracy attractive to ordinary people. Throughout history the emancipative strive for civil liberties provided the strongest motivation for people to struggle for democracy (Markoff, 1996; Foweraker and Landman, 1997). Mass involvement through liberation movements and freedom campaigns is an essential element of democratization processes (Bernhard, 1993; Casper and Taylor, 1996; Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow, 2001). The manifestation of civil liberties makes democratization a constitutive element in the broader process of human development. Hence, the

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1 To be more precise, this statement applies solely to generalized interpersonal trust, not to intimate interpersonal trust. The former is less intensive but has a larger social radius, which is important to fuel the diversity of human interactions that keep complex modern societies working. Intimate interpersonal trust, by contrast, is limited to closely-knit groups that can exist in isolation from each other with no bridging ties at all. Thus, intimate interpersonal trust does not produce the sorts of social capital that are needed to process the diverse interactions of complex societies.
Civil liberties define the room of choice that is given to the people so that they can shape their lives autonomously. Voting rights are part of people’s choices but they are not the only part. Thus, from the human development perspective, it is inappropriate to narrow one’s perspective on merely electoral democracy, focusing solely on political voting rights. Electoral democracy can be easily abused to hide severe deficiencies in other civil liberties. Under the formal structure of a perfectly electoral democracy there can be a completely illiberal democracy that preserves authoritarian structures. Contemporary Russia seems to represent such an example. People Power does not only rest in political voting rights and universal suffrage. It rests in the whole set of civil liberties. According to Isaiah Berlin (1957), these liberties include rights to “private” decision making freedom (“negative” freedom from state authority) as well as rights to “political” decision making freedom (“positive” freedom over state authority). Both sets of rights, private and political, make civil liberties complete. Considering the full set of civil liberties, leads one to focus on liberal democracy, not electoral democracy. Other theoretical perspectives might guide one to focus on other forms of democracy. But the perspective of human development guides one to focus on liberal democracy.

Some authors use dichotomous classifications that divide political regimes into democracies and non-democracies (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; 2000). Ignoring its conceptual and methodological flaws (on this point see Elkins, 2000), this approach might be appropriate, if one is interested in merely “electoral democracy.” For a country either does have or does not have freely elected representatives and governments (Collier and Adcock, 1999). By contrast, such binary simplicity does not apply to liberal democracy (Bollen and Paxton, 2000). Instead of being entirely present or absent, elements of liberal democracy can be present or absent by degree. Even among countries that are categorically classified as non-democracies, there can be considerable differences in the extent to which they accept or repress civil liberties. In a dichotomous classification Singapore, for instance, would count for most of the time as a non-democracy, together with North Korea, although few observers would doubt that North Korea represses civil liberties more strictly than Singapore. Hence, we consider liberal democracy as a matter of degree, spanning various gradations from the complete absence to the full presence of civil liberties. In the perspective of liberal democracy, elections and voting rights are relevant as just one application of civil liberties but not as the only one.

We combine the Freedom House scores for personal and political rights to measure the formal presence of liberal democracy (Freedom House, 2001). 2 Although

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2 Freedom House measures the presence of individual freedom on scales from 1 to 7 for what the organization calls “civil liberties” and “political rights.” As argued in the preceding footnote, this terminology is misleading. To be sure, there is a difference between the liberties granting private decision making freedom and the liberties granting political decision making freedom. But both sorts of liberties are “civil” (in the republican notion of citizenship) and both are based on individual rights. Hence, we add both freedom scales, considering their sum as an indication of “civil liberties” or “civil rights” (we use these two terms synonymously). On both of the two freedom scales, 1 indicates the highest and 7 the lowest level of civil liberties. We reversed these scales so that higher figures indicate
alternative measures exist, such as the Polity scores of Gurr and Jaggers (1995), we use the Freedom House scores because our theoretical perspective focuses on human choice. From the perspective of human choice, decision making freedom, both private and political, and the rights protecting it are the most essential elements of democracy (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953). Thus, the extent of liberal democracy is measured as follows:

Formal presence of liberal democracy (0 to 12 scale):

Civil Rights, t = (Personal Rights, t + Political Rights, t) - 2

(0 to 12 scale) (1 to 7 scale) (1 to 7 scale)

Our major claim is that the emancipative nature of self-expression values transforms modernization into a process of human development, which manifests “human choice” as a practiced principle in the operation of modern societies. A major consequence of rising self-expression values in this context is the promotion of liberal democracy as a political system that institutionalizes human choice, by entitling people to civil rights. From this perspective, it is evident to analyze at first the institutional presence and occurrence of liberal democracy—which we did in the preceding chapters.

The institutional presence of civil liberties is a necessary element of liberal democracy. Without these liberties there can be no genuinely liberal democracy. For democracy is a constitutional phenomenon based on legal rights. However, the institutionalization of civil liberties measures the presence or absence of democracy in a merely formal sense. For the presence of civil liberties is not identical to their effective practice. What is required in addition to their mere presence to make civil liberties an effectively practiced reality in society is the rule of law, that is, law-abiding elites who exert state power and corporate power under recognition of people’s civil rights. From their original invention in classic Athens, civil rights have been institutionalized to limit state power and despotic government (Finer, 1999). But to fulfill this function, civil rights need rule of law, honest uses of state power, and law-abiding elites that make the institutional presence of civil rights effective. Hence, the next step in our attempt to clarify the relation between self-expression values and liberal democracy is to examine the relation between these values and effective versions of liberal democracy.

By using the term “effective” democracy we do not mean whether democracy is “successful” in terms of its policy outcomes. For example, whether democracies create economic growth or not, is not part of the definition of democracy. Policy outcomes, such

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3 For the quality of these measures and their relationship to other indices of democracy, see Bollen and Paxton (2000). All of these measures show relatively strong correlations (see the table in Gurr and Jaggers 1995).

4 To be more precise, rule of law makes civil liberties effective at the supply-side, that is, on the part of institutions and elites. To make civil liberties fully effective requires the practice of these liberties on the demand-side as well, that is, by the people. However, we keep these two aspects of effectiveness, elite behavior and mass behavior, separate. The term effective democracy used here refers solely to the supply-side of liberal democracy: meaning the extent to which elites respect given civil rights.
as economic growth, are not part of what makes democracy effective with respect to its definitional elements. At least, this is true for liberal democracy, which is defined in terms of legal rights and not in terms of economic benefits. Hence, when we talk about effective democracy we mean effectiveness with respect to the central definitional elements of liberal democracies: civil rights. Effective democracy in this sense simply means the extent to which formally institutionalized civil rights are effective in practice, that is, in the elites’ use of state power (Rose, 2001).

So far we used the ratings from Freedom House to measure civil rights. These ratings measure the institutional absence or presence of civil rights but not necessarily the effective practice of these rights by the state. Effective civil rights need rule of law to take effect. State officials and decision makers must respect these rights when they exercise power. Otherwise civil rights are disregarded and exist only on paper, which means they are ineffective for people, depriving them of effective choices in their daily lives. Thus, in order to measure effective democracy one should grade the formal presence of civil liberties by measures of rule of law.\(^5\)

Effective democracy reflects the extent to which office holders use their power in ways that do not deprive ordinary people of their rights as citizens. Thus, the most serious violation of effective democracy is elite corruption (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Heller, 2000; McFaul, 2001, 2002; Brzezinski, 2001; Brown, 2001; Fairbanks, 2001; Rose, 2001; Shevtsova, 2001; Fish, 2002). By definition, corruption means that office holders do not provide the services to the public to which the law obliges them. Instead, they provide services only to particularly privileged people who can afford to buy these services in exchange for favors and extra-payments. This means an abuse of power and a violation of the rights of ordinary people who are deprived of the services to which they are legally entitled, if they cannot only get them for the payment of bribes. Corruption nourishes conspiracy networks held together by mutual obligations, fueling nepotism, favoritism, and familism. Corruption distributes privileges in highly discriminatory and selective ways, which disenfranchises the mass of the people. Corruption undermines People Power. This is obvious in the electoral process when favoritism governs the selection of candidates and when votes are pre-defined along the lines of patron-client networks, depriving voters of any meaningful choice. Whoever is studying how elections work in practice in much of rural India, knows what we mean (see Heller, 2000). In a nutshell, corruption is the opposite of rule of law. By definition, it undermines the effectiveness of civil rights.

In order to measure effective democracy, one needs a measure of the extent to which civil rights are institutionalized, measuring the formal presence of liberal democracy—plus a measure of the degree to which office holders respect these rights in

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\(^5\) Rose (2001) argues in exactly the same way but simply averages measures of the formal presence of civil rights and rule of law. Such an additive combination is theoretically inappropriate because it allows high levels of rule of law to compensate for low levels of civil rights. Thus, a country would come out with a medium level of effective democracy, even if it has no civil rights at all, if only its elites behave according to the existing laws. Until recently, Singapore would have come close to such a case. For this reason, we prefer a weighing procedure in which measures of rule of law are used to grade given measures of civil rights. This does not allow high scores in rule of law to compensate for low scores in civil rights. In the best case, a high rule of law score reproduces a given civil rights score.
their use of power. The first of these two components is measured by the Freedom House scores. Although these measures are intended to measure genuine civil rights, they neglect the extent to which these rights are set into effect by law-abiding elite behavior. Freedom House claims to measure a society’s real civil liberties, but these measures are unrealistically generous in many cases. Once a society holds free elections, Freedom House tends to rate it as “free,” giving it scores at or near the top of their scales. Thus, the new democracies in Eastern Europe are given scores that are as high as those of the established democracies of Western Europe, although any in-depth analyses (see Rose, 2001) reveals that these new democracies are more deficient than the Freedom House scores would indicate. The Freedom House scores tend to equate formal versions of liberal democracy with effective versions. Hence, it is necessary to supplement them, in order to measure the extent to which democratic institutions are actually effective, providing the citizens with genuine freedom of choice.

The “control of corruption” scores created by the World Bank (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003) provide the most comprehensive and methodologically profoundest measure of law-abiding and honest elite behavior, or “elite integrity.” These measures are calculated from various expert polls and population surveys that indicate perceptions about the extent to which office holders abuse public power for private benefits. A sophisticated “unobserved components” method is used to make corruption perceptions from 25 different sources comparable across countries and to summarize them into a single factor scale, in which growing scores indicate increasing absence of corruption, or elite integrity. We transformed the World Bank control-of-corruption scores into a scale that has a maximum of 1.0. We use this measure of elite integrity to grade the institutional presence of civil rights (or formal democracy). This procedure yields an index of effective democracy that measures efficacy-graded percentages of formal democracy (after having transformed the 0-12 combined Freedom House scores into a percentage scale in which the maximum 12 is equated to 100). Since we use the most recent Freedom House and World Bank scores from 2000-2002, we obtain a measure of effective democracy in 2000-2002:

Effective Democracy (i.e., efficacy-weighed formal democracy):

Formal Democracy * Elite Integrity
(Percentages) (Fractions from 0 to 1)

Although elite integrity grades the effectiveness of given civil liberties, it cannot compensate for an absence of civil rights. As a grading factor, elite integrity cannot do more than grade what is given. In the best case, it reproduces a given level of formal democracy. Even if we have a maximum elite integrity level of 1.0 (no elite corruption), this factor cannot raise a low level of formal democracy, it simply maintains it. However, a low degree of elite integrity can heavily devalue a high level of formal democracy, reflecting the fact that there are large variations in the extent to which effective democracy is actually present among societies categorized as formal democracies. A high level of formal democracy is a necessary condition for reaching a high score on effective democracy, but it is not sufficient. Imagine a country with a constitution that guarantees a
full set of civil rights; if this country is governed by corrupt elites who do not respect these rights, it renders them irrelevant. In such a case even the highest score for formal democracy will be downgraded close to zero, since elite integrity scores close to zero. We think this measurement is a meaningful representation of reality—at least of the reality of people’s choice.

In short, effective democracy measures the extent to which a society not only has civil liberties on paper, but in which these liberties are respected effectively by the state and its power holders. The extent to which civil liberties are set into effect, spans a continuum ranging from societies with little or no real democracy to societies with fully effective democracy.

As Figure 11-1 illustrates, it is more difficult for a country to obtain a high score on effective democracy than on formal democracy. Formal democracy translates into effective democracy in a curvilinear way: A relatively large variation on the lower half of the formal democracy scale translates into a relatively small variation in effective democracy; while a small variation in the top quarter of the formal democracy scale translates into large variations in effective democracy. This reflects the fact that formal democracy is a necessary condition to create effective democracy: Only nations scoring high in civil rights (i.e., above the 75th percentile) can reach high scores on effective democracy. But civil rights are not a sufficient condition for effective democracy: Not all countries scoring high in civil rights also score high on effective democracy— it depends on their level of elite integrity. Elite integrity is a crucial factor in differentiating between formal and effective democracy.

This reflects an important aspect of reality. For example, Freedom House assigns Latvia and Slovakia the same scores on formal democracy as Britain or Germany (about 90% of the maximum score in each case), but Britain and Germany score considerably higher on effective democracy than Latvia and Slovakia (about 75% of the maximum score compared to about 35%). If we took the formal democracy measure at face value, we would conclude that Latvia and Slovakia are just as democratic as Britain or Germany. But in reality, they have relatively corrupt elites who devalue the constitutional rights their people theoretically possess (see Rose, 2001; Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2003). Conversely, while there is huge variation in levels of formal democracy among lower income countries ranging from below the 10th percentile in the case of China to the 75th percentile in the case of India, widespread elite corruption devalues these differences considerably: China scores at the 5th percentile on effective democracy and India just below the 30th percentile. Taking into account the effectiveness of a society’s civil rights, the situation in India is even a bit closer to that of China than to that of Japan, although India ranks much higher on formal democracy than China. Effective democracy is a more demanding and more meaningful measure than formal democracy: it reflects how much freedom people actually have, rather than how much freedom they have on paper. Because effective democracy is what people are actually seeking when they emphasize self-expression values, we expect these values to be even more closely linked with effective democracy than with formal democracy.
Analytical Strategy

What type of mass values shows the strongest linkage to democracy? The following tables present correlation and regression analyses in which a society’s levels of formal and effective democracy are associated with aggregate measures of each of the aforementioned values. It should be noted that the two measures of democracy were made in 2000-2002, while all of their political culture predictors were measured five to ten years earlier. Hence, the temporal ordering does not allow to interpret the effects we find as reflecting the influence of democratic institutions on political culture. Moreover, the regressions control for the temporal autocorrelation of democracy, introducing the duration of a society’s experience with democracy up to the mid 1990s as an additional
predictor, to control for the possibility that the effects of mass values on subsequent democracy are an artifact of these values’ dependence on prior democracy.\textsuperscript{6}

Accordingly, we analyze the effects of mass values on subsequent measures of democracy in so far as these effects are independent from a society’s democratic tradition. The duration of a society’s experience with democracy generally has a positive influence on its subsequent democratic performance (Wessels, 1996). We control this effect, examining whether given mass values have an additional impact on subsequent measures of democracy. Holding the democratic tradition constant also helps us control for the influence of Western culture, since Western societies have the longest democratic tradition. Thus, controlling the duration of the democratic tradition means that the effects we find do not result from the presence or absence of a Western democratic heritage.

The following tables are organized in a way that one sees the effects of the specific types of mass values on a society’s democratic performance, differentiating formal and effective versions of liberal democracy. It is clear from these tables that the explained variances in the formal presence of liberal democracy are considerably lower than those in the effective practice of liberal democracy, indicating that formal democracy is a less socially-rooted phenomenon than effective democracy—a finding that has already been explored in detail in Chapter 8. Nonetheless, the same pattern applies to both formal democracy and effective democracy: The mass values that provide the strongest explanation of effective democracy, also provide the strongest explanations of formal democracy. Since effective democracy is the more meaningful dependent variable, our interpretation will focus on the explanation of effective democracy.

The Legitimacy Approach

Confidence in institutions has been declining, particularly in advanced Western democracies, for the past several decades (Pharr, Putnam and Dalton, 2000; Newton and Norris, 2000; Newton, 2001). Because it is often assumed that high confidence in institutions is essential to democracy, this sharp decline of confidence has drawn much attention, reviving the thesis of a legitimacy crisis that Huntington, Crozier and Watanuki (1975) articulated some time ago. But is confidence in institutions actually crucial to the presence and functioning of democracies? Does lower confidence in institutions produce less effective democracies? In order to answer these questions we use measures of a public’s average level of institutional confidence as described below.

\textsuperscript{6} To construct the measure of years of democracy, we used the “Autocracy-Democracy” scale constructed by Gurr (1975) and based on concepts developed by Eckstein (1975) in the Polity-Project (see also Eckstein and Gurr, 1975; Gurr, Jaggers and Morre, 1990; Gurr and Jaggers, 1995; Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). This scale measures the degree of restrictions of executive power and the degree of public influence in constituting executive power by a scale from $-10$ (maximum autocracy) to $+10$ (maximum democracy). Gurr and Jaggers classify a country as a “coherent democracy,” if it scores at least $+7$. We calculated for each country the number of years in which it scored at least $+7$, counting years from a country’s national independence or from 1850 (the start of the time series of the data set) until 1995. The data of the Polity Project reach farther back in time than other democracy scores. So they are the only scores on which one can base a measure of the duration of a country’s democratic tradition.
The Values Surveys ask: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” We summed up the options “a great deal of confidence” and “quite a lot of confidence” coding them as 1, versus 0 for the remaining two options. Individual-level factor analysis indicates that “police,” “legal system” and “parliament” tap a distinct dimension of state institutions that create, apply and enforce a society’s laws. We added the scores for confidence in these institutions to create a scale of “confidence in state institutions.” Calculating national averages on this scale produces an index that yields any fraction between 0 and 3. Moreover, we summed the confidence in all institutions for which people have been asked throughout the recent three waves of the VS. In addition to “police,” “legal system,” and “parliament,” this index of “overall confidence in institutions” includes “church,” “armed forces,” “press” and “labor unions.” This summation yields a 0-7 index. Since confidence in any type of institution is positively correlated with confidence in any other type, adding confidence in various types does not end up in a zero-sum game in which confidence in one type would be offset by non-confidence in another type.

Using these measures, the first two rows in Table 11-2 illustrate that there is hardly any significant relationship between people’s confidence in institutions and a society’s subsequent democratic performance across various types of societies. However, it is possible that confidence in institutions does not operate in the same way across different types of societies but works to the benefit of democracy only within the limits of a given democratic heritage. In this case a society’s prior democracy would suppress the effect of confidence in institutions and this would become evident as one controls for prior democracy. This is done by the regression analyses in Table 11-3, which control for a society’s prior democratic tradition. However, even holding prior democracy constant, public confidence in institutions has no significant effect on a society’s subsequent democratic performance. This result holds true regardless of whether one examines the impact of confidence in state institutions or confidence in all types of institutions. If there is anything to be said about the influence of public confidence in institutions, it is rather negative than positive, as the negative signs of the various correlation and regression coefficients indicate.

Surprising as it may seem in the light of the literature on this subject (see Pharr, Putnam and Dalton, 2000), public confidence in institutions does not affect a society’s democratic performance in any general way. High or low levels of confidence in institutions can be found in any type of political system, regardless of its democratic performance. Some longstanding authoritarian states, such as China, show high levels of confidence in institutions; while some long established democracies, such as the U.S., show low levels of confidence in institutions. Public confidence in institutions does not systematically differ between societies that have a long or a short experience with democracy. And it has no significant effect on a society’s subsequent democratic performance, regardless of whether we do or do not control for prior democracy. This finding casts doubts on the role that some researchers ascribe to confidence in institutions.
and the importance of its recent decline throughout developed societies. This confirms our interpretation in Chapter 4 that the decline of confidence in institutions does not pose a threat to democracy—it reflects the emergence of less deferential, more elite-challenging publics in postindustrial societies. In recent decades, the publics of

Table 11-2. Zero-Order Correlations between Political Culture Indicators and Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlates</th>
<th>Correlations with Formal Democracy 2000-02</th>
<th>Correlations with Effective Democracy 2000-02</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy Approach:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in State Institutions in early 1990s</td>
<td>-.15 (63)</td>
<td>.19* (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Confidence in Institutions in early 1990s</td>
<td>-.14 (63)</td>
<td>-.11 (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Democracy in mid 1990s</td>
<td>-.26** (50)</td>
<td>-.35** (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Democracy in mid 1990s</td>
<td>.31** (61)</td>
<td>.33** (61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy-Democracy Preference in mid 1990s</td>
<td>.65*** (61)</td>
<td>.63*** (61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communitarian Approach:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Activity in Social Associations in early 1990s</td>
<td>-.08 (60)</td>
<td>-.11 (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Voluntary Activity in Associations in early 1990s</td>
<td>-.13 (60)</td>
<td>-.11 (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm Obedience in early 1990s</td>
<td>.16 (63)</td>
<td>.22* (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Trust in early 1990s</td>
<td>.31** (63)</td>
<td>.59*** (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Development Approach:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist Liberty Aspirations in early 1990s</td>
<td>.65*** (63)</td>
<td>.78*** (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance of Sexual Liberty in early 1990s</td>
<td>.67*** (63)</td>
<td>.77*** (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing Petitions in early 1990s</td>
<td>.63*** (63)</td>
<td>.76*** (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Satisfaction in early 1990s</td>
<td>.50*** (63)</td>
<td>.66*** (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Expression Values Syndrome in early 1990s</td>
<td>.69*** (63)</td>
<td>.88*** (63)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Significance levels: *p<.10   **p<.01   ***p<.001
postindustrial societies have come to scrutinize their political institutions with an increasingly critical eye—which can actually be a healthy development for democracy (Norris, 1999). It tends to give rise to a more expressive and more direct form of democracy (see Cain, Dalton and Scarrow, 2003). Our findings suggest that high levels of public confidence in institutions are not a valid indicator of a pro-democratic civic
culture. By the same token, low levels of public confidence in institutions do not necessarily involve a threat to democracy. This does not mean that confidence in institutions is entirely irrelevant. It might be relevant in more specific ways than those tested here. But even if this were the case, it remains true that confidence in institutions has no general effect on democracy that would operate in the same way across all units of observation. This finding disqualifies confidence in institutions as a general indicator of a pro-democratic civic culture.

Mass confidence in institutions is unrelated to particular types of political systems but this is not true of system support itself. By definition, system support is specific to the system to which it refers. Accordingly, one would assume that mass support for a democratic system creates pressures to attain or sustain democracy. Actually, this is the reason why many regional survey programs, including the New Democracies Barometer, the LatinoBarometer and the AfroBarometer, have included questions on people’s satisfaction with the democratic quality of their political systems and their general approval to having a democratic system. We will examine these measures. But we also follow Klingemann (1999), arguing that one should not only consider support for democracy as such but also in relation to support for alternative regimes. Thus, we measure people’s autocracy-democracy preference by subtracting their approval of autocracy from their approval of democracy. This measure reflects people’s net preference for democracy. Measuring regime preferences in this way is important because many people might not have a clear understanding of democracy, expressing strong support for both democratic and non-democratic forms of government. In such cases, the individuals’ support for democracy is offset by their support for authoritarian regimes. By contrast, people showing a strong net preference for democracy are expressing strong support for democracy and at the same time expressing a strong rejection of authoritarian forms of government. Accordingly, people showing a strong net preference for democracy are classified as “solid democrats.”

The Values Survey asks: “On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in your country?” The four possible answers on this question have been recoded as to create a 0-3 index with larger numbers indicating more “satisfaction with democracy.”

“Approval of democracy” is measured by people’s endorsement of the statement “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government” on a four-point 0-3 index.

The “autocracy-democracy preference” is measured as follows: one first sums up the extent to which a respondent endorses the statements “Having a democratic political system” and “Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government.” Approval of these statements can be expressed in four categories: “very good” (coded 3), “fairly good” (coded 2), “fairly bad” (coded 1) and “very bad” (coded 0) with the former and “agree strongly” (coded 3), “agree” (coded 2), “disagree” (coded 1) and “disagree strongly” (coded 0) with the latter. Thus, support for these statements adds up to produce a scale from 0 to 6, with 6 representing the highest support for democracy. In the second step, we sum up people’s agreement that “Having a strong leader who does not
“have to bother with parliament and elections” and “Having the army rule” would be a good way to run this country. This also creates a 0-to-6 scale, measuring support for authoritarian forms of government. We then subtract support for authoritarian rule from support for democracy, yielding an index from –6 (maximum support for autocracy) to +6 (maximum support for democracy). Finally, we calculated the percentage of people scoring at least +3 on this index to obtain the percentage of “solid democrats” for each country.

Table 11-2 shows that a public’s average satisfaction with democracy is significantly but negatively correlated with subsequent measures of formal and effective democracy. Taken at face-value, this result may seem paradoxical, since it indicates that societies show a better democratic performance as people are more dissatisfied with the democratic performance. Yet this finding makes perfect sense, if one assumes that the endurance of democracy leads people to take its existence for granted so that they become more pretentious, expressing more easily their dissatisfaction with actual deficiencies. Under this assumption, greater dissatisfaction simply reflects more pretentious evaluation standards, which arise from a growing experience with democracy. Consequently, the negative impact of satisfaction with democracy on actual democracy should vanish when one controls for prior democracy. This is exactly what happens as the regression in Table 11-3 shows.

Plausibly, a public’s average approval of the statement that democracies are the best form of government shows a significantly positive correlation with subsequent measures of formal and effective democracy (Table 11-2). But controlling for prior democracy this effect becomes insignificant, as Table 11-3 shows. With the autocracy-democracy preference, the case is different. The bivariate correlations shown in Table 11-2 indicate a significantly positive linkage between a public’s system preferences for democracy versus autocracy and subsequent measures of formal and effective democracy. Controlling for prior democracy, the effect remains highly significant, with the societies’ system preferences explaining 20 percent of their variation in effective democracy (that is unexplained by prior democracy). Thus, a public’s net preference for democracy seems to be more relevant for its democratic quality than satisfaction with the current performance of democracy and more relevant than public confidence in institutions. This indicates that neither satisfaction with democracy nor confidence in institutions reflect system support on a more general level: even if people live in a democracy and strongly prefer democracy to authoritarian rule, they may be critical of how specific institutions are currently run by their elites. This would result in expressing low confidence in these institutions and low satisfaction with the current state of democracy, despite a strong preference for democracy versus autocracy. Precisely this is the actual situation in many Western democracies: overwhelming majorities of the public support democracy versus alternative forms of government, but at the same time express

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The positive effect of approval for democracy on actual democracy does not contradict the negative effect of satisfaction with democracy on actual democracy. At the societal-level higher scores of approval for democracy go together with lower scores of satisfaction with democracy, reflecting that stronger approval moves a public to more pretentious standards, under which actual deficiencies are noticed more critically—decreasing the overall level of satisfaction.
low confidence in institutions and low satisfaction with the performance of democracy (Klingemann, 1999; Newton, 2001). Living under conditions that manifest high existential security and individual autonomy makes people place a high priority on self-expression and democracy—but at the same time, the public in general becomes increasingly critical of authority. Declining confidence in institutions and decreasing satisfaction with democracy do not reflect an erosion of democratic values. Obviously, these are no general indicators of a pro-democratic civic culture. System preferences for democracy versus autocracy, by contrast, do seem to be a general indicator of a pro-democratic civic culture. For the effect operates in the same fashion across all units of observation.

The Communitarian Approach

Scholars of social capital and advocates of communitarian ideas stress voluntary activity in associations, arguing that voluntary engagement feeds the communal life and the civil-societal ground on which strong democracy rests (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Norris, 2002: chapter 8). This view can be traced back to de Tocqueville (1994 [1837]) who considered voluntary associations as the “schools of democracy.” We measure a society’s level of voluntary activity in associations as follows:

The Values Surveys ask about membership in several types of voluntary associations: “Now I’m going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?” Since the concept of social capital emphasizes face-to-face interaction, we coded the option “active membership” as 1 and the remaining options as 0. Individual-level factor analyses show that four of these associations, namely “charity organizations,” “church organizations,” “educational organizations” and “environmental organizations” tap a distinct dimension of “social associations” that provide welfare services for the broader community. The scores for these four associations were added to create a scale of “voluntary activity in social associations.” Calculating national averages on this scale yields any fraction between 0 and 3. Moreover, we created a summary index of people’s “overall voluntary activity in associations” adding activity in “labor unions,” “political parties” and “professional associations” to the previous ones, which yields a 0-6 scale. These include all associations for which people have been asked throughout the three recent waves of the Values Surveys. This additive procedure is unproblematic because factor analyses show no polarity between different associations. Accordingly, there are no trade-offs that would make adding activities in different types of associations a zero-sum game, in which activities in some associations cancel out activities in others.

Again, this is not a hypothesis of an individual-level effect: a society’s average satisfaction with democracy tends to move down, as its average approval of democracy moves up. This is an ecological effect occurring at the societal-level, not necessarily at the individual-level.
As Tables 11-2 and 11-3 indicate, a society’s level of activity in associations shows no significant effect on its democratic quality whatsoever, regardless of whether we do or do not control for prior democracy. Voluntary activity in associations does not explain any variation in formal or effective democracy. This finding holds for activity in social associations and overall activity in associations. Like public confidence in institutions, voluntary activity in associations does not affect democracy in any general way—and probably for the same reasons. Neither public confidence in institutions nor activity in associations is necessarily linked with democracy’s focus on human choice. Simply knowing the level of activity in associations does not tell us whether their members support authoritarian principles or democratic principles. Germany already had a highly developed associational life under the Kaisers, but until after World War II participation in associational life did not foster democracy.

This finding would be surprising to anyone who assumes that active membership in associations in general plays a key role in making democracy possible—but the empirical evidence is unequivocal: it gives no support to this assumption, even if a society’s democratic heritage is held constant as to test whether associational activity helps only within the limits of already existing democracy. However, even this is not the case. This does not necessarily mean that the level of people’s associational activity is entirely irrelevant to democracy. Actually, it might be contingent on the values on the basis of which associational activity is exerted.

The finding that voluntary activity in associations does not by itself operate in favor of democracy leads us to the values that are considered as conducive to democracy. Within the communitarian camp, it has been argued that a public whose citizens show a high level of trustworthiness in that they follow social norms and obey the laws is particularly important for democracies. These values are usually described as “trustworthiness,” “civic morality,” or “civic honesty” (Coleman, 1990; Scholz and Lubell, 1998; Tyler, 1998; Uslaner, 1999; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Rothstein, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 2001). For we are not so sure that these values are really an aspect of civicness, we describe them in the following as “norm obedience.” Following the above cited authors, we measure norm obedience as follows:

The Values Surveys ask: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card” (on which 1 means “always justifiable” and 10 means “never justifiable”). Among the various statements people have been asked to rate, the following tap a distinct dimension (individual-level factor loadings in parentheses): “Avoiding fare on public transport” (.86), “someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties” (.80), “cheating on taxes if you have a chance” (.77) and “claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled” (.59). We summarized people’s ratings of these statements in a factor scale, which we then averaged at the national level. Higher scores on this index of “norm obedience” indicate that a public expresses greater disapproval of norm violations.

Tables 11-2 and 11-3 demonstrate that norm obedience has no significant relationship with formal or effective democracy, regardless if we control for prior democracy or not. We cannot conclude that norm obedience works generally to the benefit of democracy,
even not within the limits of a society’s democratic tradition. The problem of norm obedience is the same as with confidence in institutions and voluntary activity in associations: it is unspecific to democracy’s emancipative focus on human choice. Moreover, it is not at all clear to us that norm obedience is in general a sign of civic florescence. We think that it can also be a sign of civic misery. If one recognizes that high scores of norm obedience indicate that large parts of a public express strong disapproval of norm violations, this might simply indicate people’s awareness of the fact that high rates of norm violations are a major problem of their society. The fact that in our data the Russians score higher in norm obedience than the Fins points strongly in this direction.

Anyway, without further qualifications, norm obedience shows no effect whatsoever on a society’s democratic performance. This finding disqualifies norm obedience as a general indicator of a pro-democratic civic culture.

Interpersonal trust, by contrast, does show a significantly positive linkage with formal and effective democracy (Table 11-2). However, controlling for prior democracy (Table 11-3), the impact of interpersonal trust on formal democracy becomes less significant, while its impact on effective democracy remains highly significant, explaining 12 percent of the cross-national variance. Unlike norm obedience, interpersonal trust does have a general effect on democracy that operates in the same fashion across all units of observation. Hence, interpersonal trust does qualify as a general indicator of a pro-democratic civic culture.

So far we have a mixed picture. Three indicators emphasized by the legitimacy approach—public confidence in institutions, satisfaction with democracy and approval of democracy—have no general impact on democracy; while one indicator—system preferences for democracy versus autocracy—does have a general impact on democracy. Likewise, two indicators emphasized by the communitarian camp—voluntary activity in associations and norm obedience—turn out to have no general impact on democracy; while another indicator—interpersonal trust—has a considerable impact on democracy.

The Human Development Approach

With the indicators emphasized by our emancipative version of human development theory, the evidence is unequivocal. As Tables 11-2 and 11-3 illustrate, every component of the self-expression values syndrome has a highly significant impact on a society’s subsequent democratic quality, regardless of whether we control for prior democracy or

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9 The Values Surveys ask: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” At the individual-level, we created a dummy coding respondents opting for “most people can be trusted” 1 and all others 0. At the societal-level, we calculated national percentages of respondents reporting trust. Since the question does not include any further qualification but simply refers to people in general, we consider this as a measure of generalized interpersonal trust, instead of intimate interpersonal trust that one only has in people whom one intimately knows.

10 Following Norris (2002: chapter 8) in combining interpersonal trust with voluntary activity in associations in order to create an overall index of social capital, does not improve the explanation of a society’s democratic performance. All of the impact of the overall social capital index comes from interpersonal trust and none from voluntary activity.
not. We have already seen that this is true for interpersonal trust, which belongs to this syndrome, though it is its weakest component. But the other components of self-expression values show even stronger effects on democracy than does trust, and they explain considerably more of the variation in effective democracy, controlling for the length of time a society has lived under democratic institutions. This holds especially true of the two attitudes that focus directly on human liberty: postmaterialistic aspirations for personal and political liberty, and tolerance of other people's sexual liberty. As outlined above (see Chapter 8), liberty aspirations and liberty tolerance go hand in hand, confirming one of Erich Fromm's insights: self-respect and respecting other people are two sides of the same coin—a homocentric orientation that emphasizes the status of the person in general, including oneself and others (Maslow, 1988 [1954]: 100; Owens and Rosenberg, 2001).

Liberty aspirations and liberty tolerance are the attitudes most sharply focused on the civil rights that define liberal democracy. Accordingly, liberty aspirations and liberty tolerance show the strongest partial effects on a society's democratic quality, each explaining roughly 50 per cent of the variance in effective democracy, controlling for the length of a society's democratic tradition.

Civil protest activities, such as signing a petition, also have a significant independent effect on democracy, reflecting the fact that these activities put pressure on...
elites to be more responsive, and helped to topple authoritarian regimes and establish many of the Third Wave democracies, such as those in the Philippines, South Korea, South Africa, or the Czech Republic (Bernhard, 1993; Diamond, 1993; Foweraker and Landmann, 1997; Paxton 2002: 255-257). But although civil protests often exert pressure for democracy, they can be also directed toward undemocratic goals, at least in so far as they are decoupled from the syndrome of self-expression values (which we know is the case to only a minor extent). Thus, protest activities as such are not as sharply focused on democratic freedom as liberty aspirations and liberty tolerance. Consequently, protest activities have a slightly smaller effect on democracy than liberty aspirations and liberty tolerance. In addition, although protest activities can put institutions under pressure for democracy, these activities are in turn facilitated when democratic institutions are in place--simply because democratic institutions provide the civil rights that make protest activities a legal act, lowering the risks of joining these activities. Protest activities therefore also are influenced by prior democracy, so that the democratic tradition captures parts of the effect of protest activities on temporally subsequent measures of effective democracy. But even controlling for how long a society has experienced democracy, civil protest activities still have a significant independent effect on subsequent democracy. Civil protest activities are not just a product of democracy--they are also a motor of democratization. Again, this confirms democracy’s rooting in People Power.

We have already seen that interpersonal trust shows a significant independent effect on democracy, but this effect is considerably weaker than that of liberty aspirations and liberty tolerance. The same applies to another component of self-expression values--namely life satisfaction\textsuperscript{14}, a measure of people’s emphasis on subjective well-being. The reason why life satisfaction shows a more modest impact on democracy is similar to the case of interpersonal trust: neither interpersonal trust nor life satisfaction are as sharply focused on civil liberties as are liberty aspirations and liberty tolerance. Nonetheless both trust and satisfaction do have some impact on democracy, in so far as these attitudes are linked with liberty aspirations and liberty tolerance. This calls our attention to the common underlying dimension on which all components of self-expression values go together.

The underlying dimension that links liberty aspirations and liberty tolerance with protest activism, life satisfaction and interpersonal trust, is the self-expression values syndrome.\textsuperscript{15} As the factor loadings in Figure 11-2 indicate, postmaterialist liberty aspirations, liberty tolerance and protest activities have the highest loadings on self-

\textsuperscript{14} The Values Surveys ask: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer.” Respondents are confronted here with a 1-10 scale on which 1 means “dissatisfied” and 10 means “satisfied.” At the societal-level, we use national averages on this scale. Again, all national samples show single-peaked, median centered distributions on this scale.

\textsuperscript{15} The syndrome is measured on a scale of factor scores with zero-mean and standard deviation 1, based on a factor analyses including postmaterialist liberty aspirations, tolerance of sexual liberty, protest activity, interpersonal trust and life satisfaction (as defined in previous footnotes). We use the Kaiser-criterion (extraction of factors with Eigenvalues greater 1.0). Accordingly, one factor is extracted. Individual-level and societal-level factor loadings for the separate variables are shown in Figure 11-2.
expression values. By contrast, interpersonal trust and life satisfaction share smaller proportions of this variance. This creates an asymmetrical linkage with democracy, which is mainly shaped by liberty aspirations, liberty tolerance and elite-challenging protest activities. But even though this linkage is asymmetrical, the combination with its weaker components is nevertheless important: The self-expression values syndrome as a whole shows a stronger impact on democracy than any of its components, including liberty aspirations. As Tables 11-2 and 11-3 demonstrate, the strength of self-expression values explains 75 per cent of the variation in effective democracy, controlling for how long a society has lived under democratic institutions. The whole is greater than the average of its parts.

Given components of the self-expression values syndrome, in particular liberty aspirations, and the syndrome as a whole explain far more of the variance in effective democracy than any of the indicators endorsed by the rival schools.

Figure 11-2. Factor Loadings on the Self-expression Values Dimension
Multivariate regressions shown in Table 11-4 strikingly confirm this result. Controlling for the self-expression values syndrome, no mass attitude outside this syndrome has a significant effect on democracy; but the impact of self-expression values remains highly significant and is almost completely undiminished when we control for the other political culture indicators, regardless which one we use. Comparing these findings with those in Table 8-4, one can conclude that the effect of self-expression values on democracy does not seem to be an artifact of any other societal factor, whether structural or cultural. This is surprising because all prominent theories in political culture champion other factors than self-expression values.

These findings support the interpretation that the rise of a culture that emphasizes human self-expression constitutes the single most important force in strengthening democracy. For this force is inherently linked with democracy’s innate focus on human choice. Consequently, other mass attitudes show an effect on democracy in so far as—and almost only in so far as—they are linked with the emancipative thrust of human self-expression. Considered in this light, effective democracy can be understood as the institutional manifestation of social forces emphasizing human choice and self-expression—as our theory of human development holds. Self-expression values seem to be the most crucial component of a democratic civic culture— which implies that a democratic civic culture does not involve a strong component of “subject orientations,” as Almond and Verba (1963) argued.

**The Centrality of Postmaterialist Liberty Aspirations**

All components of the self-expression values syndrome show significant linkages with democracy. This syndrome involves interpersonal trust, emphasis on subjective well-being reflected in life satisfaction, civil protest activities, liberty tolerance and postmaterialist aspirations for personal and political liberty. These things go together because they reflect a culture in which survival is sufficiently secure that outgroups do not seem threatening, people feel safe to trust others, and where self-reliance, creativity and initiative take high priority. Increasingly, freedom of expression and freedom of choice are highly valued, both for oneself and for others.
Table 11-4. The Impact of Self-expression Values on Effective Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors:</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Effective Democracy 2000-2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years under Democracy up to 1990</td>
<td>( \beta = .18^* ) ( t = 1.82 ), ( \beta = .15^* ) ( t = 1.62 ), ( \beta = .14 ) ( t = 1.47 ), ( \beta = .17^* ) ( t = 1.72 ), ( \beta = .12 ) ( t = 1.25 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Expression Values Syndrome in early 1990s</td>
<td>( \beta = .74^{<em><strong>} ) ( t = 7.94 ), ( \beta = .69^{</strong></em>} ) ( t = 6.92 ), ( \beta = .78^{<em><strong>} ) ( t = 8.16 ), ( \beta = .75^{</strong></em>} ) ( t = 7.19 ), ( \beta = .72^{***} ) ( t = 7.11 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Confidence in Institutions in early 1990s</td>
<td>( \beta = -.05 ) ( t = -.71 ), ( \beta = .03 ) ( t = .47 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy-Democracy Preference in mid 1990s</td>
<td>( \beta = .14^* ) ( t = 1.90 ), ( \beta = .15^* ) ( t = 2.00 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Activity in Associations in early 1990s</td>
<td>( \beta = -.08 ) ( t = -1.33 ), ( \beta = -.08 ) ( t = -1.28 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm Obedience in early 1990s</td>
<td>( \beta = -.01 ) ( t = -.18 ), ( \beta = -.02 ) ( t = -.13 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted ( R^2 )</td>
<td>.77, .80, .78, .77, .80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>62, 60, 59, 62, 58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are standardized beta-coefficients with T-values in parentheses.

Significance levels:  *\( p < .10 \)  **\( p < .01 \)  ***\( p < .001 \)
Strong emphasis on human choice lies at the core of the self-expression values syndrome. This fact becomes clearer when we focus on postmaterialist liberty aspirations, which pronounce personal and political freedom. These aspirations are the ones that are most directly relevant to human choice. Thus, liberty aspirations provide the most direct impetus for human development.

To be sure, liberty aspirations are a postmaterialist phenomenon that tends to be most pronounced in postindustrial societies. But liberty aspirations are no exclusive property of postindustrial societies. Elements of postindustrial societies, such as a modern service sector, are emerging to various degrees and almost all societies. And so are liberty aspirations: they exist to varying degrees in all societies, and the extent to which they are present tends to shape a society’s affinity to the presence and quality of democracy.

As Table 11-2 has shown, postmaterialist liberty aspirations outperform all other components of the self-expression values syndrome, in predicting subsequent democracy. The syndrome of self-expression values as a whole has an even more powerful impact on democracy, but the rise of liberty aspirations seems to be the single most central element in constituting the linkage between self-expression values and democracy.

The survival vs. self-expression values dimension represents a polarization between conformist survival values emphasizing collective discipline, group conformity and state authority versus emancipative self-expression values emphasizing individual liberty, human diversity and civic autonomy. Thus, the relationship that other mass attitudes have with liberty aspirations indicates how closely these attitudes reflect the principles of conformism or emancipation. Attitudes that are positively correlated with liberty aspirations rather reflect the principle of emancipation; and attitudes that are uncorrelated or negatively correlated with liberty aspirations are closer to the principle of conformism. This explains why some attitudes favored by the communitarian and the legitimacy approaches were found to have no impact on democracy, while others did: attitudes that have a strong linkage with liberty aspirations, do have an impact on democracy. For these attitudes are linked to democracy’s innate focus on human choice and freedom.

For example, public confidence in institutions has no impact on democracy (see Table 11-3 above), reflecting that confidence in institutions is uncorrelated with liberty aspirations. Confidence in institutions can be as strong in authoritarian societies as it is in democratic societies. And mass liberty aspirations correlate with public confidence in state institutions at an insignificant $r = .05$ (N = 61) and with overall confidence in institutions at a slightly significant but negative $r = -.18$ (N = 61). By contrast, system preferences for democracy versus autocracy have a significant impact on democracy, reflecting the fact that system preferences correlate strongly and significantly with liberty aspirations at $r = .53$ (N = 61).

Similarly, among the voluntary activities in various associations, none showed a significant effect on democracy, reflecting that voluntary activity in associations is not significantly linked with liberty aspirations: the societal-level correlations are insignificant and weak ($r = -.12^{n.s.}$ with overall activity in associations, $r = -.03^{n.s.}$ with activity in social associations). Finally, mass levels of life satisfaction, protest activities and liberty tolerance all show significant effects on democracy, reflecting that all these components are strongly correlated with liberty aspirations, generating the self-expression values syndrome.
Figure 11-3 provides a summary picture of these findings, showing that the linkage between a political culture indicator and effective democracy is a linear function of this indicator’s linkage with liberty aspirations.

Intrinsic and Instrumental Support for Democracy

Most of the research on the linkages between mass attitudes and democracy has focused on measuring overt support for democratic institutions. This is understandable: the most obvious and direct way to measure mass support for democracy would be to ask people if they favor democracy, and whether they prefer it to other forms of government. But, as we have seen, certain other attitudes, which converge in the syndrome of self-expression values, are even better indicators of the extent to which a given society’s political culture is conducive to democracy, than is overt support for democracy itself.

A decade has passed since the Third Wave of democratization brought an avalanche of new, relatively unstable democracies into being, raising the question, “How solid is support for democracy in these countries?” In the intervening years, public support for democracy has faded in some countries, many of which are democratic in name only. Studies of Russian political culture (Fleron and Ahl, 1998; Gibson, 1996, 1997, 2001; Gibson and Duch, 1994; Miller et al., 1994; Rose, 2000) have pointed out that a solid majority of the Russian people support democratic institutions. With varying nuances, these studies concluded that the outlook for democracy was good.

Although this literature is perfectly correct in finding that most Russians have favorable attitudes toward democracy, when these findings are examined in broader cross-cultural perspective one finds that support for democracy is relatively weak in Russia—indeed, it is weaker than in almost any other country among the more than 70 societies covered by the World Values Surveys. Moreover, by some important indicators, pro-democratic orientations among the Russian people became weaker, not stronger, during the 1990s. To some observers, it is unclear how long even the pretense of electoral democracy will survive in the Soviet successor states, apart from the Baltics (Brzezinski, 2001).

The prospects for democracy in Islamic countries also have been questioned, with some writers arguing that the basic values of Islamic publics may be incompatible with liberal democracy (Huntington, 1993; 1996). Contrary to this claim, we find surprisingly widespread support for democracy among the ten Islamic publics included in the 1999-2001 wave of the World Values Surveys. But how reliable are the standard indicators of support for democracy?
Several major empirical research programs monitor public support for democratic institutions, including the New Democracies Barometer, the New Russia Barometer, the LatinoBarometer, the AfroBarometer, and the Values Surveys. Some degree of consensus has developed concerning which items are most effective, so that certain questions, measuring overt support for democracy, are regularly utilized in these surveys. These questions seem well designed, and they demonstrate internal consistency: people who support democracy on one indicator, tend to support democracy on other indicators. But our faith in these measures rests entirely on their face validity: no one has demonstrated that a high level of mass support for these items actually is conducive to democratic institutions.

Today, overt support for democracy is widespread among publics throughout the world. In country after country, a clear majority of the population endorses democracy. In the last two waves of the Values Surveys an overwhelming majority of the population in
virtually every society described “having a democratic political system” as either “good” or “very good.” In the median country, fully 92 percent of those interviewed gave a positive account of democracy. The Russian public ranked lowest, with 62 percent expressing a favorable opinion of democracy. The next lowest figure was found in Pakistan, where 68 percent favored democracy. Though Pakistan ranks relatively low, most of the Islamic countries surveyed rank relatively high: in Albania, Egypt, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Morocco and Turkey from 92 to 99 percent of the public endorses democratic institutions—a higher proportion than in the U.S. Islamic publics may be anti-Western in many respects but, contrary to widespread belief, the democratic ideal has powerful appeal in the Islamic world.

At this point in history, democracy has an overwhelmingly positive image throughout the planet. This has not always been true. In the 1930s and 1940s, fascist regimes won overwhelming mass approval in many countries; and for many decades, communist regimes had widespread support. But in the past decade, democracy has become virtually the only political model with global appeal. Although Francis Fukuyama may have exaggerated in calling this “The End of History,” we do seem to be living in a genuinely new era in which the main alternatives to democracy have been discredited.

Research on political culture was motivated by the assumption that pro-democratic attitudes are conducive to democratic institutions. If this is true, democracy should be most prevalent in countries where pro-democratic attitudes are widespread. But this is not the case. Our results indicate that mass responses to the questions just examined are correlated with democracy at the societal-level, but many of them are weak predictors.

Table 11-2 has shown how strongly given responses are correlated with merely formal and truly effective versions of democracy. How satisfied people are with their country’s democratic performance is weakly and even negatively linked with formal democracy and has only a modestly strong linkage with effective democracy, implying that democracy works better, if more people believe that it performs bad. Overwhelming majorities agree that “Having a democratic political system is a good way of governing this country,” but this item turns out to be a modest predictor of societal-level democracy-- showing correlations of only .31 and .33 with the formal and effective versions of actual democracy in Table 11-2. The Albanians are likelier to agree with this item than are the Swedes or the Swiss.

We cross-validate each of the variables in Table 11-2 by two separate criteria: the society’s formal presence of democracy in 2000-2002, and its effective level of democracy in 2000-2002. The correlations between mass attitudes and democracy are systematically higher when we use effective measures of democracy because political culture is a better predictor of effectively practiced democracy than of the sheer formal presence of democracy. A society is unlikely to maintain effective democracy, unless democracy has intrinsic support among the public. Likewise, effective democracy is unlikely to be absent, if democracy does have intrinsic support among the public.

The well-designed multi-item index, which measures system preferences for democracy versus autocracy, has stronger explanatory power than any one of its single components, as Table 11-2 also demonstrated. It shows a .65 correlation with formal democracy and a .63 correlation with effective democracy. Countries that rank high on
support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian rule tend to be effective democracies. Thus, the standard items used to monitor mass support for democracy can not be taken at face value—but a well-designed multi-item index does, indeed, provide a good predictor of how democratic a given society actually is.

However, several component attitudes of self-expression values (none of which refers explicitly to democracy) are even stronger predictors of effective democracy, as the bottom half of Table 11-2 has shown. The extent to which a society has an underlying culture of civilian protest and the extent to which its people give high priority to subjective well-being, freedom of speech and self-expression is an even more powerful predictor of effective democracy than are system preferences for democracy versus democracy. Postmaterialist aspirations for personal autonomy and political liberty are the strongest single predictor of how democratic a society is. Postmaterialists value democratic freedom intrinsically, and do not support democracy only in so far as it is linked with prosperity and physical security. Thus, postmaterialist liberty aspirations show a .78 correlation with a society’s level of effective democracy—a far stronger linkage than any of the items that measure explicit support for democracy; indeed, it is a much more powerful predictor of system-level democracy than the four-item system preference for democracy versus autocracy.

The most perplexing result is that system preferences for democracy versus autocracy have no independent effect on democracy, when we control for self-expression values (see Table 11-4). The items used to measure system preferences explicitly ask about support for democracy and for authoritarian alternatives. In terms of face content, they would seem to provide the most direct measures of a democratic political culture—but empirically, they prove to be much weaker predictors of democracy than are self-expression values. This is a strikingly counter-intuitive and important finding. To illustrate it, Figure 11-4 shows the impact of system preferences for democracy versus autocracy and self-expression values on effective democracy, with mutual controls.

Based on evidence of all four waves of the Values Surveys, Figure 11-4a shows the impact of self-expression values on effective democracy, controlling for system preferences for democracy against autocracy. As this figure indicates, societies with more widespread self-expression values than their spread of democratic system preferences would suggest, also have higher levels of effective democracy than the spread of democratic system preferences would suggest (see the locations of Finland, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland and Australia). Conversely, societies with less widespread self-expression values than the spread of democratic system preferences would suggest, have lower levels of effective democracy than the spread of democratic preferences would suggest (see the locations of Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Venezuela). Overall, variation in the spread of self-expression values that is independent of the spread of preferences for democracy explains 72 per cent of the variation in effective democracy that is independent from the spread of democratic preferences. Self-expression values have a very strong effect on effective democracy, independent from democratic system preferences.
Figure 11-4a. The Partial Effect of Self-expression Values on Effective Democracy Controlling for System Preferences for Democracy

Regression:
\[ y = 2 \times 10^{-14} + 24.78 \times x \]
R squared: .72
Figure 11-4b shows the impact of system preferences for democracy on effective democracy, controlling for the spread of self-expression values. Obviously, there is a weak relationship, which only does exist because of one peculiar leverage case: Vietnam. The spread of democratic system preferences in such societies as Hungary, Nigeria or Croatia is much higher than the spread of self-expression values in these societies would suggest; whereas, countries like Mexico, Russia or Taiwan have less widespread preferences for democracy than the spread of self-expression values in these countries would suggest. Much of the variance in the spread of democratic preferences is

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The very low percentage of “solid democrats” in the case of Vietnam reflects a very high percentage of respondents expressing support for the army rule. In a country in which the army is a symbol of national liberation these figures require a different interpretation. However, we display data as they are, not eliminating cases that do not fit into the pattern.
independent of the spread of self-expression values. But this independent variation in the spread of democratic preferences accounts for only 14 per cent (without Vietnam only 7 percent) in the variation of effective democracy. Thus, decoupled from self-expression values, system preferences do not have a strong impact on effective democracy. System preferences are linked with effective democracy mostly in so far as they are linked with self-expression values. Isolating the variation in system preferences that is decoupled from self-expression values largely reduces the effect of system preferences.

The relationship between self-expression values and seemingly solid support is interesting, as Figure 11-5 demonstrates. Self-expression values explain about 20 percent of the variance in the percentage of solid democrats. But this effect reflects a curvilinear relationship, indicating that widespread self-expression values are a sufficient but not necessary condition to create majorities of “solid democrats” (i.e., percentage of people scoring at least +3 on the –6 to +6 system preference scale). If a given population is slightly above the midpoint on the self-expression values scale, at least half of its citizens will be solid democrats. There are no exceptions: relatively widespread self-expression values seem to be sufficient to create majorities of solid democrats. But the reverse does not hold: societies whose citizens place relatively low emphasis on human self-expression do not necessarily have a low proportion of solid democrats. Quite the contrary, societies that fall on the lower half of the self-expression values scale can show either high or low levels of overt support for democracy, ranging from almost 0 percent in Vietnam to 95 per cent in Bangladesh. Lip service to democracy can be based on a variety of motives, including the belief that being democratic means being rich and powerful. At this point in history, the fascist and communist models have lost their appeal, and democracy has a positive image almost everywhere (see Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Accordingly, public support for democracy is not necessarily linked to a culture that emphasizes human choice.

At the individual-level, support for democracy tends to be linked with self-expression values because almost everyone who places strong emphasis on self-expression also supports democracy. But there are many other people who do not emphasize self-expression values but support democracy for other reasons, such as the belief that democracy means being secure and prosperous. But these other motives are instrumental; they do not reflect a high valuation of democracy per se, and this type of support can quickly vanish if a society’s experience under democracy is disappointing. Our findings suggest that overt mass support for democracy leads to effective democracy only in so far as it is linked with self-expression values.

The fact that various other attitudes can motivate people to express overt support for democracy has been demonstrated by Bratton and Mattes (2001). Using survey data from the AfroBarometers, Bratton and Mattes found that individual-level support for democracy is strongly linked with performance evaluations, especially those concerning economics and law and order: people who believe that democracies are more successful than other regimes in managing economic development and reducing social tensions, tend to prefer democracies to other types of political systems. We replicated this analysis with data from the Values Surveys, with similar results (see Table 11-5): what people believe about the policy performance of democracies (which taps instrumental support) is a...
stronger predictor of their system preference for democracy, than is their emphasis on self-expression values (which tap intrinsic support). This pattern is universal since it holds true for all five types of societies: in all types of societies, instrumental support motives explain more of people’s system preferences for democracy than do intrinsic support motives. But, as we have seen, mass tendencies in intrinsic support are much more important for the actual existence and the actual quality of democracy at the system-level. To be sure, people with strong self-expression values strongly support democracy, but people who place little emphasis on self-expression values also express support for democracy, if they believe that democracies are good at running the economy and maintaining order.

Thus, overt support for democracy does not necessarily reflect intrinsic support--even if we base our measure on a well-designed four-item index that indicates net preferences for democracy against autocracy. Overt support for democracy reflects intrinsic support only in so far as it is coupled with self-expression values--and this coupling captures only a minor part of the variance in support for democracy. To a large extent, support for democracy is inflated by instrumental motives. Since intrinsic support provides stronger and more robust motivations to struggle for democracy than instrumental support, it is clear why self-expression values have a stronger effect on democracy than has overt support for democracy: self-expression values are a much stronger indicator of intrinsic support. Precisely because the questions used to measure self-expression values make no explicit reference to democracy, they are not inflated by the tendency to give lip service to democracy, which has become a socially desirable term. Not support for democracy as such is important to create a pro-democratic civic culture. What matters are the motives from which this support is deriving. The motives that are most consequential for democracy are reflected in self-expressions values.

Figure 11-6 illustrates this point, showing that today’s world is no longer differentiated in support for democracy as such; it is differentiated in instrumental and intrinsic sorts of support. To show this, we calculated for each society the percentage of people scoring on at least +3 on the –6 to +6 autocracy-democracy preference scale. Then

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agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them?” The ratings of the following statements have been added and averaged on an index measuring an “expected negative performance of democracy”: “In democracy, the economic system runs badly,” “democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling,” “democracies aren’t good at maintaining order.”
Figure 11-5. Self-expression Values and Support for Democracy

Regression:
\[ y = 60.13 + 9.64 \times x \]
\[ R \text{ squared: .20} \]
Table 11-5. Explaining Individual-Level System Preferences for Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Postindustrial Democracies</th>
<th>Developing Societies</th>
<th>Western Ex-commun. Societies</th>
<th>Eastern Ex-communist Societies</th>
<th>Low-Income Societies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intrisic</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Intrisic</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on self-expression values</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected negative performance of democracy</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R$^2$</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are standardized beta-coefficients. All coefficients significant at the .001-level.

Figure 11-6. Proportions of Instrumental and Intrinsic Supporters of Democracy

Support for Democracy:
1  Overall Supporters
2  Instrumental Supporters
3  Intrinsic Supporters
Figure 11-7. Instrumental versus Intrinsic Support among Cultural Zones
we differentiated the supporters of democracy into those ones placing relative strong emphasis on self-expression values (i.e., those scoring above zero on the factor scale) and classified them as “intrinsic supporters.” Likewise, we classified those supporters of democracy placing weaker emphasis on self-expression values (below zero) as “instrumental supporters.” Finally, we calculated average proportions of these supporters for our five types of societies. As is obvious from Figure 11-6, even Eastern ex-communist countries and low-income societies contain large proportions of people expressing overt support for democracy, but the proportion of intrinsic supporters is clearly the lowest in these societies. Not by accident, these are precisely the societies where we find the lowest actual levels of democracy. Finally, as Figure 11-7 illustrates, the extent to which the societies of different cultural zones have effective democracy, largely reflects the discrepancy between intrinsic and instrumental support for democracy. Rising self-expression values transform instrumental into intrinsic support for democracy—the only sort of support that really helps democracies to emerge and to survive.

Summary

Our findings point to three conclusions:

(1) We find strong evidence that broader civic values-- in particular those focusing on freedom and self-expression-- are more important to democracy than is overt support for democratic institutions. This is true because democracy does not reflect a merely institutional phenomenon. It reflects a civic phenomenon, involving citizens who practice democratic principles in their daily lives. This confirms the assumptions of de Tocqueville, Almond and Verba, Eckstein, Putnam and many others, that making democracy work requires civic values among the public.

(2) Among the civic values, trust in other people is important for democracy—but mostly through its linkage with other components of self-expression values such as liberty aspirations, which show a more direct relationship to democracy. Postmaterialist liberty aspirations reflect an intrinsic preference for democratic procedures and rules, because they are inherently directed toward attaining civil liberties. Self-expression values, which encompass liberty aspirations, denote an intrinsic, not an instrumental, preference for democracy.

(3) In relation to the conformism-emancipation polarity linked with the survival vs. self-expression values dimension, levels of voluntary activity in the classic bureaucratically organized associations, and public confidence in (hierarchically organized) institutions tend to reflect an emphasis on social conformism rather than on human emancipation. Since human emancipation is at the heart of democracy’s focus on choice, attitudes that emphasize social conformism are not positively linked with democracy at the system-level. System support alone is not sufficient for democracy to flourish. Mass support for democracy is a good thing—especially in so far as it is intrinsically motivated. But overt support for democracy can be little more than shallow lip service. By contrast, self-expression values reflect a valuation of human choice in itself. Such values imply an
intrinsic preference for the type of political institution that most effectively guarantees human choice— democracy.

Democracy is not just a set of rules that depend solely on good institutional engineering. It is an inherently normative construction based on a specific conception of human nature—one that emphasizes choice, autonomy, and emancipation (see Macpherson, 1977; Donnelly, 2000). To make this normative conception work, requires more than superficial endorsement of the now-fashionable term, democracy. It requires a commitment to human choice and emancipation, rooted in self-expression values. Unless support for democracy is coupled with these values, it is all but irrelevant for effective democracy at the system-level. Effective democracy is not simply a matter of institutional arrangements; it reflects deeply anchored normative commitments. These commitments evolve to a new level with the cultural shift from survival values to self-expression values, reshaping social forces to shift their emphasis from social conformism to civic emancipation—in keeping with the logic of human development. Our indicator of self-expression values was developed only in recent years and undoubtedly can be improved. But it seems to be the most valid indicator of a democratic civic culture that is currently available.
LITERATURE


Gibson, James L. 2000. “.”


